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Abstract
The property rights approach to the theory of the rm is the most prominent
application of the incomplete contracting paradigm. A central conclusion of
the standard model says that joint ownership is suboptimal. In this note,
we analyze a modied version of the standard model that is tailored to the
organization of R&D activities, where one of the parties is wealth-constrained
and protected by limited liability. It turns out that joint ownership can be
optimal, since it avoids wasteful rent-seeking activities when limited liability
rents are necessary to induce high e¤ort. Our results are in line with the fact
that R&D activities are often conducted in research joint ventures.
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1 Introduction
The property rights approach to the theory of the rm based on the incomplete
contracting paradigm has been one of the major advances in microeconomics in
the past three decades (see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990;
Hart, 1995).1 By now, the property rights theory has been successfully applied
in various elds such as industrial organization, international trade, corporate
nance, organizational economics, political economy, and privatization theory.
The starting point of the property rights approach is the observation that
ownership allocations correspond to allocations of residual control rights; i.e.,
the owner has the right to make decisions in circumstances not covered by a
prior contract.
A central conclusion of the basic model is that joint ownership (i.e, bilateral
veto power) cannot be optimal. However, it has already been emphasized by
Holmström (1999) that joint ventures are an important part of the corporate
landscape, so the standard prediction that joint ownership cannot be optimal
seems to be counterfactual. In particular, in the context of R&D activities,
research joint ventures are a prominent organizational form.2 In the present
paper, we present a novel explanation for the optimality of joint ownership. In
our model, one of the contractual parties has to exert e¤ort to come up with
an innovation. In line with Aghion and Tiroles (1994a,b) management-of-
innovation setup, we suppose that this party has no resources and is protected
by limited liability.
Specically, we consider the relationship between a principal (say, a cus-
tomer) and a wealth-constrained agent (say, a research unit). At the outset,
the parties agree on a project, but a complete contract cannot yet be written.
Subsequently, each party can invest e¤ort to come up with modications to
1The incomplete contracts approach is at the center of Oliver Harts work, who has
recently been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences together with Bengt Holmström
(cf. Nobel Prize Committee, 2016).
2See e.g. Caloghirou et al. (2003).
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the project.3 In line with Hart et al. (1997), we assume that the owner has
the right to decide whether or not a modication is implemented. Finally, the
principal o¤ers a contract and the agent exerts unobservable e¤ort, yielding
either a successful innovation or a failure. In order to induce the agent to
exert high e¤ort, the principal must leave a limited-liability rent to the agent
(cf. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, ch. 4).4 The rent depends on the success
probability when low e¤ort is exerted, which in turn depends on which mod-
ication is implemented. When the principal is the owner, she will invest in
modications that reduce the agents rent. When the agent is the owner, he
will invest in modications that increase his rent. Under joint ownership, no
rent-seeking investments take place, because each party has veto power. Thus,
joint ownership may be strictly optimal since it can avoid costly activities to
inuence the agents limited-liability rent.
For example, consider a small wealth-constrained biotechnology rm and a
large pharmaceutical company who want to develop a new combination medi-
cine. Exerting high e¤ort means testing all conceivable combinations, while
exerting low e¤ort means that only a few combinations are tested. Given low
e¤ort, experienced researchers have a larger success probability than inexpe-
rienced researchers, because they have a better intuition about which combi-
nations are most promising. Given high e¤ort, all combinations are tested,
so the success probability is independent of whether the researchers are ex-
perienced or inexperienced. The owner has the right to make costly changes
3This aspect distinguishes our model from Aghion and Tiroles (1994a,b) setup, where
joint ownership cannot be strictly optimal. Investments in modications to a project have
also been studied by Hart et al. (1997), yet they do not investigate the e¤ects of limited
liability.
4For early papers on the e¤ects of limited liability, see Innes (1990) and Pitchford (1998).
More recent papers on contracting under limited liability include e.g. Ohlendorf and Schmitz
(2012), Kragl and Schöttner (2014), Pi (2014, 2018), Cato and Ishihara (2017), and Kräkel
(2017). Yet, these papers are focused on complete contracting problems; i.e., the implications
of di¤erent ownership allocations are not studied in this literature.
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to the composition of a given research team consisting of both experienced
and inexperienced researchers. Our model suggests that such changes will be
made under sole ownership by either the biotechnology rm or the pharma-
ceutical company, but not in case of a joint venture. Since in equilibrium high
e¤ort will be exerted, costly reorganizations of the research team are wasteful
rent-seeking activities, so a joint venture is optimal.
Related literature. To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the
rst one showing that joint ownership can be optimal due to limited liability
constraints, which often play a central role in the context of research activities
(cf. the R&D gamein Tirole, 1999, p. 745). The paper thus contributes to
the literature that tries to explain the optimality of joint ownership in situa-
tions di¤erent from those studied in the original Grossman-Hart-Moore setup.
For instance, other potential explanations for joint ownership include repeated
interactions (Halonen, 2002), investment spillovers (Rosenkranz and Schmitz,
2003; Gattai and Natale, 2016; Hamada, 2017), sequential investments (Lülfes-
mann, 2004), adverse selection (Schmitz, 2006, 2008), and transaction costs
(Müller and Schmitz, 2015). See Gattai and Natale (2017) for a comprehensive
survey on explanations for the optimality of joint ownership in various depar-
tures from the original setup of the property rights approach to the theory of
the rm.
2 The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, an agent A and a principal P , who can work
on a project in the future. The agent has no wealth and is protected by limited
liability. The reservation utilities are zero. At date 0, an ownership structure
o 2 fA;P; Jg is xed. Moreover, the basic characteristics of the project are
specied. In line with the property rights approach to the theory of the rm,
it is not yet possible to write more detailed contracts at date 0.
At date 1, each party i 2 fA;Pg can invest e¤ort xi 2 f0; 1g in order to
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develop modications to the project. Let the disutility of e¤ort be given by xik,
where k > 0. The investment decisions are observable but non-contractible.
At date 2, modications to the project can be implemented. Under agent-
ownership (o = A), the agent has the right to implement modications to the
project. Under principal-ownership (o = P ), the principal has the right to
implement modications to the project. Under joint ownership (o = J), both
parties have veto power, so modications can be implemented only if both
parties agree.
At date 3, the principal o¤ers a contract to the agent.5 At date 4, the agent
can exert unobservable e¤ort e 2 f0; 1g. The disutility of e¤ort is ec, where
c > 0. At date 5, there is either a success or a failure, which is veriable. The
success probabilities are p if e = 1 and q if e = 0, where 0 < q < p < 1. If
there is a success, the principal gets a revenue R > 0.
Let q = q0 in the basic version of the project. At date 1, by incurring a
disutility of e¤ort k, each party can develop one of two modications. Mod-
ication I means that the success probability given low e¤ort is increased to
q = qH 2 (q0; p). Modication II means that the success probability given low
e¤ort is reduced to q = qL 2 (0; q0). For simplicity, we assume that otherwise
a modied project is identical to the basic project. It will turn out that the
agent can only be interested in developing modication I, while the principal
can only be interested in developing modication II.
We assume throughout that R is su¢ ciently large, such that at date 3 the
principal always o¤ers a contract that induces the agent to exert high e¤ort.
Assumption 1. Suppose that R > pc
(p qH)2 .
5The simplifying assumption that one of the parties has all the bargaining power is often
made in the related literature (see e.g. Hart and Moore, 1999, p. 119). It is straightforward
to generalize our results to the case in which also the agent has some bargaining power (in
analogy to the approach taken in the appendix of Hart and Moore, 1999).
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3 Optimal ownership
First, consider agent-ownership (o = A). At date 3, the principal o¤ers to
make a payment w1  0 to the agent if there will be a success at date 5, while
otherwise the payment will be w0  0. Note that at date 4 the agent will exert
high e¤ort (e = 1) whenever the incentive-compatibility constraint
pw1 + (1  p)w0   c  qw1 + (1  q)w0
is satised. The principals expected date-3 payo¤ is then given by p(R  
w1)   (1   p)w0. It is straightforward to show that the principal will always
set w0 = 0. Hence, the principal will o¤er
w1 =
c
p  q .
As a consequence, at date 3 the expected continuation payo¤ of the principal
is
uP (q) = p

R  c
p  q

,
while the agents expected continuation payo¤ is
uA(q) =
qc
p  q .
Observe that uP (q) is a decreasing function, while uA(q) is an increasing
function. Therefore, if at date 2 modication I is available, it will be imple-
mented by the agent and hence q = qH . Otherwise, the agent will stick to the
basic version of the project, q = q0.6
At date 1, the principal will not invest in modications of the project, since
only modication I would be implemented by the agent, which would reduce
6Note that at date 3 the principal will o¤er a contract that induces the agent to exert
high e¤ort, so q has no inuence on the expected total surplus that the parties can generate
from date 2 on. As a consequence, there is no scope for mutually benecial renegotiation.
At date 2, the modied projects yield the same expected surplus as the original project,
even though the implications for the agents rent di¤er.
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uP (q). However, the agent will invest in modication I provided that
k < uA(qH)  uA(q0) = qH   q0
(p  q0) (p  qH)pc.
Next, consider principal-ownership (o = P ). The analysis of the decisions
at dates 3 and 4 remains unchanged. Yet, if at date 2 modication II is
available, it will now be implemented by the principal and hence q = qL.
Otherwise, the principal will stick to the basic version of the project, q = q0.
Thus, at date 1 the agent will not invest in modications of the project, since
only modication II would be implemented by the principal, which would
reduce uA(q). The principal will invest in modication II provided that
k < uP (qL)  uP (q0) = q0   qL
(p  q0) (p  qL)pc:
Finally, consider joint ownership (o = J). The analysis of dates 3 and 4
remains again unchanged. At date 2, the principal would always veto imple-
menting modication I, while the agent would veto implementing modication
II. As a consequence, the parties will stick to the basic version of the project,
q = q0. For this reason, no party will invest e¤ort in developing modications
to the project at date 1.
Let the partiesexpected total surplus be denoted by So. We can now state
our main result.
Proposition 1 (i) If k < minf qH q0
(p q0)(p qH) ;
q0 qL
(p q0)(p qL)gpc, then o = J is
strictly better than o = A and o = P . Specically, SJ = pR   c > SA =
SP = pR  c  k.
(ii) If qH q0
(p q0)(p qH)pc < k <
q0 qL
(p q0)(p qL)pc, then o = A and o = J are strictly
better than o = P . Specically, SA = SJ = pR  c > SP = pR  c  k.
(iii) If q0 qL
(p q0)(p qL)pc < k <
qH q0
(p q0)(p qH)pc, then o = P and o = J are strictly
better than o = A. Specically, SP = SJ = pR  c > SA = pR  c  k.
(iv) If k > maxf qH q0
(p q0)(p qH) ;
q0 qL
(p q0)(p qL)gpc, then the ownership structure
does not matter, since SA = SP = SJ = pR  c.
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In particular, part (i) of the proposition shows that if the e¤ort costs of com-
ing up with modications to the project are su¢ ciently small, then joint own-
ership is strictly better than both agent-ownership and principal-ownership,
which is in contrast to the standard conclusion of the property rights theory.
Intuitively, due to limited liability the principal must leave a rent to the agent
in order to implement high e¤ort. When the costs of modifying the project
are su¢ ciently small, then under P -ownership the principal will invest e¤ort
to reduce the agents rent, while under A-ownership the agent will invest e¤ort
to increase his rent. Joint ownership is optimal, since it avoids these wasteful
rent-seeking activities.
4 The role of limited liability
It should be emphasized that our result that joint ownership can strictly out-
perform A-ownership and P -ownership depends on the assumption that the
agent is protected by limited liability. To see this, suppose that there were no
wealth constraints, so that payments to the agent could be negative. At date 3,
the principal would then o¤er a contract w1 = R  [pR c] and w0 =  [pR c].
At date 3, the expected continuation payo¤ of the principal is pR  c, and the
agents expected continuation payo¤ is zero (i.e., the agent does not get a rent).
These payo¤s do not depend on q, so regardless of the ownership structure no
party would ever invest in modications I or II of the project. Therefore, in
the absence of limited liability, ownership would not matter in our model.7
7One could extend our model by allowing both parties to also make productive invest-
ments at date 1, such that in line with the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore setup joint
ownership would be strictly suboptimal in the absence of limited liability constraints. In the
presence of limited liability, joint ownership would then be optimal if the rent-seeking losses
under A- and P -ownership were larger than the welfare gains generated by the productive
investments.
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5 Conclusion
In the standard property rights theory, joint ownership is suboptimal. We have
considered an R&D setup where the agent is protected by limited liability. The
principal and the agent can engage in rent-seeking activities in order to develop
modications to the project. Subsequently, the agent exerts unobservable e¤ort
to come up with an innovation. It has turned out that joint ownership can be
optimal, since it avoids wasteful rent-seeking activities.
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